Archive for the ‘Malware’ Category

Ads 182 Times More Dangerous Than Porn

Thursday, February 7th, 2013

Cisco Annual Security Report: Threats Step Out of the Shadows

From the post:

Despite popular assumptions that security risks increase as a person’s online activity becomes shadier, findings from Cisco’s 2013 Annual Security Report (ASR) reveal that the highest concentration of online security threats do not target pornography, pharmaceutical or gambling sites as much as they do legitimate destinations visited by mass audiences, such as major search engines, retail sites and social media outlets. In fact, Cisco found that online shopping sites are 21 times as likely, and search engines are 27 times as likely, to deliver malicious content than a counterfeit software site. Viewing online advertisements? Advertisements are 182 as times likely to deliver malicious content than pornography. (emphasis added)

Numbers like this make me wonder: Is anyone indexing ads?

Or better yet, creating a topic map that maps back to the creators/origins of ad content?

That has the potential to be a useful service, unlike porn blocking ones.

Legitimate brands would have an incentive to stop malware in their ads, origins of malware ads would be exposed (blocked?).

I first saw this at Quick Links by Greg Linden.

Mapping and Monitoring Cyber Threats

Thursday, June 21st, 2012

Mapping and Monitoring Cyber Threats

From the post:

Threats to information security are part of everyday life for government agencies and companies both big and small. Monitoring network activity, setting up firewalls, and establishing various forms of authentication are irreplaceable components of IT security infrastructure, yet strategic defensive work increasingly requires the added context of real world events. The web and its multitude of channels covering emerging threat vectors and hacker news can help provide warning signs of potentially disruptive information security events.

However, the challenge that analysts typically face is an overwhelming volume of intelligence that requires brute force aggregation, organization, and assessment. What if significant portions of the first two tasks could be accomplished more efficiently allowing for greater resources allocated to the all important third step of analysis?

We’ll outline how Recorded Future can help security teams harness the open source intelligence available on various threat vectors and attacks, activity of known cyber organizations during particular periods of time, and explicit warnings as well as implicit risks for the future.

Interesting but I would add to the “threat” map known instances where recordable media can be used, email or web traffic traceable to hacker lists/websites, offices or departments with prior security issues and the like.

Security can become too narrowly focused on technological issues, ignoring that a large number of security breaches are the result of human lapses or social engineering. A bit broader mapping of security concerns can help keep the relative importance of threats in perspective.

Adobe Releases Malware Classifier Tool

Wednesday, April 4th, 2012

Adobe Releases Malware Classifier Tool by Dennis Fisher.

From the post:

Adobe has published a free tool that can help administrators and security researchers classify suspicious files as malicious or benign, using specific machine-learning algorithms. The tool is a command-line utility that Adobe officials hope will make binary classification a little easier.

Adobe researcher Karthik Raman developed the new Malware Classifier tool to help with the company’s internal needs and then decided that it might be useful for external users, as well.

” To make life easier, I wrote a Python tool for quick malware triage for our team. I’ve since decided to make this tool, called “Adobe Malware Classifier,” available to other first responders (malware analysts, IT admins and security researchers of any stripe) as an open-source tool, since you might find it equally helpful,” Raman wrote in a blog post.

“Malware Classifier uses machine learning algorithms to classify Win32 binaries – EXEs and DLLs – into three classes: 0 for “clean,” 1 for “malicious,” or “UNKNOWN.” The tool extracts seven key features from a binary, feeds them to one or all of the four classifiers, and presents its classification results.”

Adobe Malware Classifier (Sourceforge)

Old hat that malware scanners have been using machine learning but new that you can now see it from the inside.

Lessons to be learned about machine learning algorithms for malware and other uses with software.

Kudos to Adobe!

Improved Call Graph Comparison Using Simulated Annealing

Friday, November 18th, 2011

Improved Call Graph Comparison Using Simulated Annealing by Orestis Kostakis, Joris Kinable, Hamed Mahmoudi, Kimmo Mustonen.

Abstract:

The amount of suspicious binary executables submitted to Anti-Virus (AV) companies are in the order of tens of thousands per day. Current hash-based signature methods are easy to deceive and are inefficient for identifying known malware that have undergone minor changes. Examining malware executables using their call graphs view is a suitable approach for overcoming the weaknesses of hash-based signatures. Unfortunately, many operations on graphs are of high computational complexity. One of these is the Graph Edit Distance (GED) between pairs of graphs, which seems a natural choice for static comparison of malware. We demonstrate how Simulated Annealing can be used to approximate the graph edit distance of call graphs, while outperforming previous approaches both in execution time and solution quality. Additionally, we experiment with opcode mnemonic vectors to reduce the problem size and examine how Simulated Annealing is affected.

From the introduction:

To facilitate the recognition of highly similar executables or commonalities among multiple executables which have been subject to modification, a high-level structure, i.e. an abstraction, of the samples is required. One such abstraction is the call graph which is a graphical representation of a binary executable, where functions are modelled as vertices and calls between those functions as directed edges. Minor changes in the body of the code are not reflected in the structure of the graph.

Can you say subject identity? ;-)

How you judge subject identity depends on the circumstances and requirements of any given situation.

Very recent and I suspect important work on the detection of malware.

Using Machine Learning to Detect Malware Similarity

Wednesday, September 21st, 2011

Using Machine Learning to Detect Malware Similarity by Sagar Chaki.

From the post:

Malware, which is short for “malicious software,” consists of programming aimed at disrupting or denying operation, gathering private information without consent, gaining unauthorized access to system resources, and other inappropriate behavior. Malware infestation is of increasing concern to government and commercial organizations. For example, according to the Global Threat Report from Cisco Security Intelligence Operations, there were 287,298 “unique malware encounters” in June 2011, double the number of incidents that occurred in March. To help mitigate the threat of malware, researchers at the SEI are investigating the origin of executable software binaries that often take the form of malware. This posting augments a previous posting describing our research on using classification (a form of machine learning) to detect “provenance similarities” in binaries, which means that they have been compiled from similar source code (e.g., differing by only minor revisions) and with similar compilers (e.g., different versions of Microsoft Visual C++ or different levels of optimization).

Interesting study in the development of ways to identify a subject that is trying to hide. Not to mention some hard core disassembly and other techniques.