Archive for the ‘Military’ Category

Got Balls?

Sunday, May 19th, 2013

IED Trends: Turning Tennis Balls Into Bombs

From the post:

Terrorists are relentlessly evolving tactics and techniques for IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), and analyzing reporting on IEDs can provide insight complementary to HUMINT on emerging militant methods. Preparing for an upcoming webcast with our friends at Terrogence, we found incidents using sports balls, particularly tennis balls and cricket balls, more frequently appearing as a delivery vehicle for explosives.

When we break these incidents from the last four months down by location, the city of Karachi in southern Pakistan stands out as a hotbed. There is also evidence that this tactic is being embraced around the globe as you can see sports balls fashioned into bombs found from Longview, Washington in the United States to Varanasi in India.

We can use Recorded Future’s Web Intelligence platform to plot out the locations where incidents have recently occurred as well as the frequency and timing.

Interesting but the military, by their stated doctrines, should be providing this information in theater specific IED briefings.

See for example: FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT

On boobytraps (the old name) in general, see: FM 5-31 Boobytraps (1965), which includes pressure cookers (pp. 73-74) and rubber balls (p. 87).

Topic maps offer over rapid dissemination of “new” forms and checklists for where they may be found. (As opposed to static publications.)

Interesting that FM 5-31 reports an electric iron as boobytrap, but an electric iron is more likely to show up on Antiques Roadshow than as an IED.

At least in the United States.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Friday, March 29th, 2013

The Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) at the Naval Postgraduate School

From opportunity:

This BAA’s primary objective is to attract outstanding researchers and scholars who will research topics of interest to the security studies community. Research will focus on expanding knowledge related to countering weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass effect (WMD/WME). The program solicits innovative proposals for research on WMD/WME counter proliferation, nonproliferation, and strategy to be conducted mainly during the January 2014 through September 2015 timeframe. In this BAA, the phrase “security studies research” refers to research in all disciplines, fields, and domains that (1) are involved in expanding knowledge for national defense, and (2) could potentially improve policy and international relations for combating WMD. Disciplines include, but are not limited to: Political science, sociology, history, biology, chemistry, economics, homeland defense, and public policy.

Applications don’t close until March 31, 2014 but there isn’t any reason to wait until the last minute to apply. ;-)

Don’t know but information sharing across agencies could be an issue, along with other areas where topic maps would really shine.


BTW, some representative research from this program.

US drone strikes listed and detailed in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen

Thursday, August 2nd, 2012

US drone strikes listed and detailed in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen

From Simon Rogers of the Guardian.

Photos of women and children as casualties, linked to particular drone attacks might make drone technology seem less acceptable.

Known Unknowns

Wednesday, August 1st, 2012

I discovered a good example of a “known unknown” today. The GAO report entitled: Multiple DOD Organizations are Developing Numerous Initiatives gives a good example.

From the summary:

We identified 1,340 potential, separate initiatives that DOD funded from fiscal year 2008 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2012 that, in DOD officials’ opinion, met the above definition for C-IED initiatives. We relied on our survey, in part, to determine this number because DOD has not determined, and does not have a ready means for determining, the universe of C-IED initiatives. Of the 1,340 initiatives, we received detailed survey responses confirming that 711 initiatives met our C-IED definition. Of the remaining 629 initiatives for which we did not receive survey responses, 481 were JIEDDO initiatives. JIEDDO officials attribute their low survey returns for reasons including that C-IED initiatives are currently not fully identified, catalogued, and retrievable; however, they expect updates to their information technology system will correct this deficiency. Our survey also identified 45 different organizations that DOD is funding to undertake these 1,340 identified initiatives. Some of these organizations receive JIEDDO funding while others receive other DOD funding. We documented $4.8 billion of DOD funds expended in fiscal year 2011 in support of C-IED initiatives, but this amount is understated because we did not receive survey data confirming DOD funding for all initiatives. As an example, at least 94 of the 711 responses did not include funding amounts for associated C-IED initiatives. Further, the DOD agency with the greatest number of C-IED initiatives identified—JIEDDO—did not return surveys for 81 percent of its initiatives.

Our survey results showed that multiple C-IED initiatives were concentrated within some areas of development, resulting in overlap within DOD for these efforts—i.e., programs engaged in similar activities to achieve similar goals or target similar beneficiaries. For example, our survey data identified 19 organizations with 107 initiatives being developed to combat cell phone-triggered IEDs. While the concentration of initiatives in itself does not constitute duplication, this concentration taken together with the high number of different DOD organizations that are undertaking these initiatives and JIEDDO’s inability to identify and compare C-IED initiatives, demonstrates overlap and the potential for duplication of effort. According to JIEDDO officials, the organization has a robust coordinating process in place that precludes unintended overlap. However, through our survey and follow-up with relevant agency officials, we found examples of overlap in the following areas: (1) IED-related intelligence analysis: two organizations were producing and disseminating similar IED-related intelligence products to the warfighter, (2) C-IED hardware development: two organizations were developing similar robotics for detecting IEDs from a safe distance, and (3) IED detection: two organizations had developed C-IED initiatives using chemical sensors that were similar in their technologies and capabilities.

Our survey results showed that a majority of respondents said they communicated with JIEDDO regarding their C-IED initiatives; however, JIEDDO does not consistently record and track this data. Based on our prior work, JIEDDO does not have a mechanism for recording data communicated on C-IED efforts. Therefore, these data are not available for analysis by JIEDDO or others in DOD to reduce the risk of duplicating efforts and avoid repeating mistakes. (emphasis added)

As the summary points out, there is no reason to presume duplication with 1,340 initiatives to address the same problem. Why would anyone think that?

And for that matter, you have to have data from the 629 non-responding programs. BTW, 481 of those are from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, JIEDDO. I don’t guess there is any reason to call attention to the organization responsible for defeating IEDs is busy not tracking efforts to defeat them.

Any known unknowns in your organization?

DoD Lists Key Needed Capabilities

Monday, January 23rd, 2012

DoD Lists Key Needed Capabilities

From the post:

The Pentagon has released a list of 30 war-fighting capabilities it says it needs to fight anywhere on the globe in the future.

The 75-page document — officially called the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) — lays out how the services must work together to defeat anti-access threats. It also will help shape development of future weapons and equipment.

“It’s a way to look at whether we’re correctly developing joint capabilities, not just service capabilities, to be able to get to where we need,” Lt. Gen. George Flynn, director of joint force development on the Joint Staff, said of the document during a Jan. 20 briefing at the Pentagon.

The document goes a step beyond the traditional fighting spaces — air, land and sea — to include space and cyberspace.

Interesting document that should give you the opportunity to learn something about the military view of the world and find potential areas for discussion of semantic integration.

Cyberspace Science and Technology RFI (U.S. Air Force)

Friday, January 13th, 2012

Cyberspace Science and Technology RFI (U.S. Air Force)

Response Date: February 24, 2012 4 pm Eastern.

From the background information:

The Air Force is requesting information on revolutionary cyberspace science and technologies that address the challenge of future Air Force cyberspace needs in cyberspace exploitation, defense, and operations for potential inclusion in the Air Force Cyber Vision 2025 study. Cyber Vision 2025 is a study to create an integrated, Air Force-wide, near-, mid- and far-term S&T vision to advance revolutionary cyber capabilities to support core Air Force missions. Cyber Vision 2025 will identify state of the art S&T and best practices in government and the private sector. It will analyze current and forecasted capabilities, threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences across core AF missions to identify key S&T gaps and opportunities. It will articulate an AF near- (FY2012-15), mid- (FY2016-20) and far-term (FY2021-25) S&T vision to fill gaps, indicating where AF should lead (creating or inventing novel solutions for core AF missions), follow (by adopting, adapting, or augmenting others investments), or watch key technologies. In alignment with the national security cyber strategy, the study is intended to address cyber S&T across Air Force core missions (air, space, cyber, and Command and Control Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C2ISR)) including DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities) considerations, engaging with industry, academia, national laboratories, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), and government to leverage capabilities and experience.

The ability to make sense out of big (heterogeneous) data should qualify as one aspect of supporting core Air Force missions.

Read the RFI, plus other suggested documents and see what you think.