## Archive for the ‘Security’ Category

### How Not To Lose A Community’s Trust

Tuesday, March 28th, 2017

From the post:

The author of the Nuclear Bot banking trojan has leaked the source code of his own malware in a desperate attempt to regain trust and credibility in underground cybercrime forums.

Nuclear Bot, also known as NukeBot and more recently as Micro Banking Trojan and TinyNuke, is a new banking trojan that appeared on the malware scene in December 2016, when its author, a malware coder known as Gosya, started advertising it on an underground malware forum.

According to Gosya's ad, this new banking trojan was available for rent and included several features, such as:

• Formgrabber and Web-Injection modules (Firefox, Chrome, IE, and Opera)
• A SOCKS proxy module
• Remote EXE file launcher module
• Hidden VNC module that worked on Windows versions between XP and 10
• Rootkit for 32-bit and 64-bit architectures
• UAC bypass
• Windows Firewall bypass
• IBM Trusteer firewall bypass
• Bot-killer – a mini anti-virus meant to remove all competing malware from the infected machine

Subsequent analysis from both Arbor Networks and Sixgill confirmed the trojan's deadly features. In spite of these favorable reports, Gosya's Nuclear Bot saw little adoption among cybercrime gangs, as the malware's author miserably failed to gain their trust.

See Catalin’s post for the most impressive list of social fails I have seen in years. Seriously.

More importantly, for hacker and other forums, learn the local customs. Always.

Enjoy!

### Hacking vs. Buying Passwords – Which One For You?

Monday, March 27th, 2017

You remember the Dilbert cartoon on corporate security where the pointed haired boss asks what Dilbert would do if a stranger offered to buy company secrets. Dilbert responds asking how much is the stranger offering? See the strip for the boss’ answer and Wally’s follow up question.

Danny Palmer reports the price point for employees who would sell their access, maybe less than you think.

From the post:

A cyberattack could cost an organisation millions, but an employee within your company might be willing to give an outsider access to sensitive information via their login credentials for under £200.

According to a report examining insider threats by Forcepoint, 14 percent of European employees claimed they would sell their work login credentials to an outsider for £200. And the researchers found that, of those who’d sell their credentials to an outsider, nearly half would do it for less.

That’s about $260.00 U.S. at today’s exchange rates. Only you know your time and expense of hacking passwords and/or buying them on the dark web. I suspect the price point is even lower in government agencies with unpopular leadership. I haven’t seen any surveys of US employees, but I suspect employees of companies, suppliers, contractors, banks, etc., involved in oil pipeline construction are equally open to selling passwords. Given labor conditions in the US, perhaps even more so. Not that anyone opposing a multi-generational environmental crime like an oil pipeline would commit a crime when there are so many lawful and completely ineffectual means to oppose it at hand. PS: As recent CIA revelations demonstrate, the question isn’t if government will betray the public’s interest but when. The same is true for environmental, health and other concerns. ### Peeping Toms Jump > 16,000 In UK Monday, March 27th, 2017 The ranks of peeping toms swells by at least 16,000 in the UK: From the post: More than 16,000 staff in the public sector and its agencies have been empower by Section 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act to snoop on people’s internet connection records. And that’s before the estimated 4,000 staff at security agency MI5, the 5,500 at GCHQ and 2,500 at MI6 are taken into account. That’s according to the responses from a series of almost 100 Freedom of Information (FOI) requests made in a bid to find out exactly who has the power to snoop on ordinary people’s web browsing histories under the Act. GCHQ, the Home Office, MI6, the National Crime Agency, the Ministry of Justice, all three armed forces and Police Service of Scotland all failed to respond to the FOI requests – so the total could be much higher. My delusion that the UK has a mostly rational government was shattered by passage of the Investigatory Powers Act. Following web browsing activity, hell, even tracking everyone and their conversations, 24 x 7, isn’t going to stop random acts of violence. What part of random acts of violence being exactly that, random, seems to be unclear? Are there no UK academics to take up the task of proving prediction of random events is possible? Unless and until the UK Parliament comes to its senses, the best option for avoiding UK peeping toms is to move to another country. If re-location isn’t possible, use a VPN and a Tor browser for all web activity. ### Looking For Installed Cisco Routers? Saturday, March 25th, 2017 News of 300 models of Cisco Catalyst switches being vulnerable to a simple Telnet attack, Cisco issues critical warning after CIA WikiLeaks dump bares IOS security weakness by Michael Cooney, for example, has piqued interest in installed Cisco routers. You already know that Nmap can uncover and identify routers. What you may not know is government hemorrhaging of IT information may be a useful supplement to Nmap. Consider GovernmentBids.com for example. You can search by federal government bid types and/or one or more of the fifty states. Up to 999 prior to the current date, for bids, which includes the bids as well as the winning vendor. If you are routinely searching for IT vulnerability information, I would not begrudge them the$131/month fee for full information on bids.

From a topic map perspective, pairing IT bid information with vulnerability reports, would be creative and valuable intelligence.

How much IT information is your office/department hemorrhaging?

### Attn: Zero-Day Hunters, ATMs Running Windows XP Have Cash

Friday, March 24th, 2017

Kimberly Crawley reprises her Do ATMs running Windows XP pose a security risk? You can bank on it! as a reminder that bank ATMs continue to run Windows XP.

Her post was three years old in February, 2017 and just as relevant as the first day of its publication.

Rather than passing even more unenforceable hacking legislation, states and congress should impose treble damages with mandatory attorney’s fees on commercial victims of hacking attacks.

Insecurity will become a cost center in their budgets, justifying realistic spending and demand for more secure software.

In the meantime, remember ATMs running Windows XP dispense cash.

### The New Handbook For Cyberwar Is Being Written By Russia

Wednesday, March 22nd, 2017

From the post:

One US intelligence officer currently involved in cyber ops said, “It’s not that the Russians are doing something others can’t do. It’s not as though, say, the US wouldn’t have the technical skill level to carry out those types of attacks. It’s that Russian hackers are willing to go there, to experiment and carry out attacks that other countries would back away from,” said the officer, who asked not to be quoted by name due to the sensitivity of the subject. “It’s audacious, and reckless. They are testing things out in the field and refining them, and a lot of it is very, very messy and some is very smart.”

Well, “…testing things out in the field and refining them…” is the difference between a potential weapon on a dry erase board and a working weapon in practice. Yes?

Personally I favor the working weapon in practice.

It’s an interesting read despite the repetition of the now debunked claim of Wikileaks releasing 8,761 CIA documents (Fact Checking Wikileaks’ Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed (Part 1))

Frenkel of course covers the DNC hack:

The hack on the DNC, which US intelligence agencies have widely attributed to Russia, could be replicated by dozens of countries around the world, according to Robert Knake, a former director of cybersecurity policy in the Obama administration.

“Russia has laid out the playbook. What Russia did was relatively unsophisticated and something that probably about 60 countries around the world have the capability of doing — which is to target third parties, to steal documents and emails, and to selectively release them to create unfavorable conditions for that party,” Knake told the BBC’s Today. “It’s unsubtle interference. And it’s a violation of national sovereignty and customary law.”

Kanke reflects the failure of major powers to understand the leveling potential of cyberwarfare. Sixty countries? You think? How about every kid that can run a phishing scam to steal John Podesta’s password? How many? 600,000 maybe? More than that?

None of who care about “…national sovereignty and customary law.”

Are you going to write or be described in a chapter of the new book on cyberwar?

### When To Worry About CIA’s Zero-Day Exploits

Wednesday, March 22nd, 2017

Chris McNab’s Alexsey’s TTPs (.. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) post on Alexsey Belan provides a measure for when to worry about Zero-Day exploits held by the CIA.

McNab lists:

• Belan’s 9 offensive characteristics
• 5 defensive controls
• WordPress hack – 12 steps
• LinkedIn targeting – 11 steps
• Third victim – 11 steps

McNab observes:

Consider the number of organizations that provide services to their users and employees over the public Internet, including:

• Web portals for sales and marketing purposes
• Mail access via Microsoft Outlook on the Web and Google Mail
• Collaboration via Slack, HipChat, SharePoint, and Confluence
• DevOps and support via GitHub, JIRA, and CI/CD utilities

Next, consider how many enforce 2FA across their entire attack surface. Large enterprises often expose domain-joined systems to the Internet that can be leveraged to provide privileged network access (via Microsoft IIS, SharePoint, and other services supporting NTLM authentication).

Are you confident safe 2FA is being enforced over your entire attack surface?

If not, don’t worry about potential CIA held Zero-Day exploits.

You’re in danger from script kiddies, not the CIA (necessarily).

Alexsey Belan made the Most Wanted list at the FBI.

Crimes listed:

Conspiring to Commit Computer Fraud and Abuse; Accessing a Computer Without Authorization for the Purpose of Commercial Advantage and Private Financial Gain; Damaging a Computer Through the Transmission of Code and Commands; Economic Espionage; Theft of Trade Secrets; Access Device Fraud; Aggravated Identity Theft; Wire Fraud

His FBI poster runs two pages but you could edit off the bottom of the first page to make it suitable for framing.

😉

Try hanging that up in your local university computer lab to test their support for free speech.

### New Wiper Malware – A Path To Involuntary Transparency

Tuesday, March 14th, 2017

From the press release:

The Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team has discovered a new sophisticated wiper malware, called StoneDrill. Just like another infamous wiper, Shamoon, it destroys everything on the infected computer. StoneDrill also features advanced anti-detection techniques and espionage tools in its arsenal. In addition to targets in the Middle East, one StoneDrill target has also been discovered in Europe, where wipers used in the Middle East have not previously been spotted in the wild.

Besides the wiping module, Kaspersky Lab researchers have also found a StoneDrill backdoor, which has apparently been developed by the same code writers and used for espionage purposes. Experts discovered four command and control panels which were used by attackers to run espionage operations with help of the StoneDrill backdoor against an unknown number of targets.

Perhaps the most interesting thing about StoneDrill is that it appears to have connections to several other wipers and espionage operations observed previously. When Kaspersky Lab researchers discovered StoneDrill with the help of Yara-rules created to identify unknown samples of Shamoon, they realised they were looking at a unique piece of malicious code that seems to have been created separately from Shamoon. Even though the two families – Shamoon and StoneDrill – don’t share the exact same code base, the mind-set of the authors and their programming “style” appear to be similar. That’s why it was possible to identify StoneDrill with the Shamoon-developed Yara-rules.

Code similarities with older known malware were also observed, but this time not between Shamoon and StoneDrill. In fact StoneDrill uses some parts of the code previously spotted in the NewsBeef APT, also known as Charming Kitten – another malicious campaign which has been active in the last few years.

For details beyond the press release, see: From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond by Costin Raiu, Mohamad Amin Hasbini, Sergey Belov, Sergey Mineev or the full report, same title, version 1.05.

Wipers can impact corporate and governmental operations but they may be hiding crimes and misdeeds at the same time.

Of greater interest are the espionage operations enabled by StoneDrill.

If you are interested in planting false flags, pay particular attention to the use of language analysis in the full report.

Taking a clue from Lakoff on framing, would you opinion of StoneDrill change if instead of “espionage” it was described as a “corporate/government transparency” tool?

I don’t recall anyone saying that transparency is by definition voluntary.

Perhaps that’s the ticket. Malware can bring about involuntary transparency.

Yes?

### That CIA exploit list in full: … [highlights]

Wednesday, March 8th, 2017

From the post:

We’re still going through the 8,761 CIA documents published on Tuesday by WikiLeaks for political mischief, although here are some of the highlights.

First, though, a few general points: one, there’s very little here that should shock you. The CIA is a spying organization, after all, and, yes, it spies on people.

Two, unlike the NSA, the CIA isn’t mad keen on blanket surveillance: it targets particular people, and the hacking tools revealed by WikiLeaks are designed to monitor specific persons of interest. For example, you may have seen headlines about the CIA hacking Samsung TVs. As we previously mentioned, that involves breaking into someone’s house and physically reprogramming the telly with a USB stick. If the CIA wants to bug you, it will bug you one way or another, smart telly or no smart telly. You’ll probably be tricked into opening a dodgy attachment or download.

That’s actually a silver lining to all this: end-to-end encrypted apps, such as Signal and WhatsApp, are so strong, the CIA has to compromise your handset, TV or computer to read your messages and snoop on your webcam and microphones, if you’re unlucky enough to be a target. Hacking devices this way is fraught with risk and cost, so only highly valuable targets will be attacked. The vast, vast majority of us are not walking around with CIA malware lurking in our pockets, laptop bags, and living rooms.

Thirdly, if you’ve been following US politics and WikiLeaks’ mischievous role in the rise of Donald Trump, you may have clocked that Tuesday’s dump was engineered to help the President pin the hacking of his political opponents’ email server on the CIA. The leaked documents suggest the agency can disguise its operations as the work of a foreign government. Thus, it wasn’t the Russians who broke into the Democrats’ computers and, by leaking the emails, helped swing Donald the election – it was the CIA all along, Trump can now claim. That’ll shut the intelligence community up. The President’s pet news outlet Breitbart is already running that line.

Iain does a good job of picking out some of the more interesting bits from the CIA (alleged) file dump. No, you will have to read Iain’s post for those.

I mention Iain’s post primarily as a way to entice you into reading the all the files in hopes of discovering more juicy tidbits.

Read the files. Your security depends on the indifference of the CIA and similar agencies. Is that your model for privacy?

### Gap Analysis Resource – Electrical Grid

Wednesday, March 8th, 2017

Electricity – Federal Efforts to Enhance Grid Resilience Government Accounting Office (GAO) (January 2017)

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reported implementing 27 grid resiliency efforts since 2013 and identified a variety of results from these efforts. The efforts addressed a range of threats and hazards—including cyberattacks, physical attacks, and natural disasters—and supported different types of activities (see table). These efforts also addressed each of the three federal priorities for enhancing the security and resilience of the electricity grid: (1) developing and deploying tools and technologies to enhance awareness of potential disruptions, (2) planning and exercising coordinated responses to disruptive events, and (3) ensuring actionable intelligence on threats is communicated between government and industry in a time-sensitive manner. Agency officials reported a variety of results from these efforts, including the development of new technologies—such as a rapidly-deployable large, highpower transformer—and improved coordination and information sharing between the federal government and industry related to potential cyberattacks.

(table omitted)

Federal grid resiliency efforts were fragmented across DOE, DHS, and FERC and overlapped to some degree but were not duplicative. GAO found that the 27 efforts were fragmented in that they were implemented by three agencies and addressed the same broad area of national need: enhancing the resilience of the electricity grid. However, DOE, DHS, and FERC generally tailored their efforts to contribute to their specific missions. For example, DOE’s 11 efforts related to its strategic goal to support a more secure and resilient U.S. energy infrastructure. GAO also found that the federal efforts overlapped to some degree but were not duplicative because none had the same goals or engaged in the same activities. For example, three DOE and DHS efforts addressed resiliency issues related to large, high-power transformers, but the goals were distinct—one effort focused on developing a rapidly deployable transformer to use in the event of multiple large, high-power transformer failures; another focused on developing next-generation transformer components with more resilient features; and a third focused on developing a plan for a national transformer reserve. Moreover, officials from all three agencies reported taking actions to coordinate federal grid resiliency efforts, such as serving on formal coordinating bodies that bring together federal, state, and industry stakeholders to discuss resiliency issues on a regular basis, and contributing to the development of federal plans that address grid resiliency gaps and priorities. GAO found that these actions were consistent with key practices for enhancing and sustaining federal agency coordination.
…(emphasis in original)

A high level view of efforts to “protect” the electrical grid (grid) in the United States.

Most of the hazards, massive solar flares, the 1859 Carrington Event, or a nuclear EMP, would easily overwhelm many if not all current measures to harden the grid.

Still, participants get funded to talk about hazards and dangers they can’t prevent nor easily remedy.

What dangers do you want to protect the grid against?

### Headless Raspberry Pi Hacking Platform Running Kali Linux

Wednesday, March 8th, 2017

From the post:

The Raspberry Pi is a credit card-sized computer that can crack Wi-Fi, clone key cards, break into laptops, and even clone an existing Wi-Fi network to trick users into connecting to the Pi instead. It can jam Wi-Fi for blocks, track cell phones, listen in on police scanners, broadcast an FM radio signal, and apparently even fly a goddamn missile into a helicopter.

The key to this power is a massive community of developers and builders who contribute thousands of builds for the Kali Linux and Raspberry Pi platforms. For less than a tank of gas, a Raspberry Pi 3 buys you a low-cost, flexible cyberweapon.

Of course, it’s important to compartmentalize your hacking and avoid using systems that uniquely identify you, like customized hardware. Not everyone has access to a supercomputer or gaming tower, but fortunately one is not needed to have a solid Kali Linux platform.

With over 10 million units sold, the Raspberry Pi can be purchased in cash by anyone with $35 to spare. This makes it more difficult to determine who is behind an attack launched from a Raspberry Pi, as it could just as likely be a state-sponsored attack flying under the radar or a hyperactive teenager in high school coding class. Blogging while I wait for the Wikileaks Vault7 Part 1 files to load into an XML database. The rhyme or reason (or the lack thereof) behind Wikileaks releases continues to escape me. Within a day or so I will drop what I think is a more useful organization of that information. While you wait, this is a particularly good post on using a Raspberry Pi “for reconnaissance and attacking Wi-Fi networks” in the author’s words. Although a Raspberry Pi is easy to conceal, both on your person and on location, the purpose of such a device isn’t hard to discern. If you are carrying a Raspberry Pi, avoid being searched until after you can dispose of it. Make sure that your fingerprints or biological trace evidence is not on it. I say “your fingerprints or biological trace evidence” because it would be amusing if fingerprints or biological trace evidence implicated some resident of the facility where it is found. The results of being suspected of possessing a Kali Linux equipped Raspberry Pi versus being proven to have possessed such a device, may differ by years. Go carefully. ### Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools In Bulk Download Tuesday, March 7th, 2017 If you want to avoid mirroring Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed for yourself, check out: https://archive.org/details/wikileaks.vault7part1.tar. Why Wikileaks doesn’t offer bulk access to its data sets, you would have to ask Wikileaks. Enjoy! ### Covert FM Radio Stations For Activists – Thumb In Eye Of Stingray Devices Thursday, March 2nd, 2017 From the post: They overlaid the audio and data on top of ambient news signals from a local NPR radio station. “FM radio signals are everywhere. You can listen to music or news in your car and it’s a common way for us to get our information,” said co-author and UW computer science and engineering doctoral student Anran Wang. “So what we do is basically make each of these everyday objects into a mini FM radio station at almost zero power. ”Such ubiquitous low-power connectivity can also enable smart fabric applications such as clothing integrated with sensors to monitor a runner’s gait and vital signs that transmits the information directly to a user’s phone. In a second demonstration, the researchers from the UW Networks & Mobile Systems Lab used conductive thread to sew an antenna into a cotton T-shirt, which was able to use ambient radio signals to transmit data to a smartphone at rates up to 3.2 kilobits per second. The system works by taking an everyday FM radio signal broadcast from an urban radio tower. The “smart” poster or T-shirt uses a low-power reflector to manipulate the signal in a way that encodes the desired audio or data on top of the FM broadcast to send a “message” to the smartphone receiver on an unoccupied frequency in the FM radio band. For the details: The UW team has — for the first time — demonstrated how to apply a technique called “backscattering” to outdoor FM radio signals. The new system transmits messages by reflecting and encoding audio and data in these signals that are ubiquitous in urban environments, without affecting the original radio transmissions. Results are published in a paper to be presented in Boston at the 14th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation in March. So government agents can cover cellphone frequencies with Stingray (“cell site simulators”) devices. Wonder if they can cover the entire FM band? 😉 I’m guessing not. You? Imagine a phone or shirt that is tuned to the frequency of a covert FM transmitter at a particular location. The information is just hanging out there but unless the “right” receiver walks by, its never known to anyone. Ideal for messages directing public gatherings with near zero risk of interception by, shall we say, unfriendly parties? Or other types of messages, imagine a singing dead drop as it were. You move away, the song goes away. Enjoy! ### Introducing Malboxes: … Sunday, February 26th, 2017 Introducing Malboxes: a Tool to Build Malware Analysis Virtual Machines From the post: Malware analysis is like defusing bombs. The objective is to disassemble and understand a program that was built to do harm or spy on computer users (oops, this is where the bomb analogy fails, but one gets the point). That program is often obfuscated (ie: packed) to make the analysis more complex and sometimes dangerous. This blog post introduces a tool that we have built that creates Windows Virtual Machines (VMs) without any user interaction. Those VMs are preconfigured with malware analysis tools and security settings tailored for malware analysis. We will then explore how to use the tool, its architecture and where we want to take it.￼ TL;DR We are announcing the first “official” release of malboxes, a tool meant to help build safe and featureful Windows machines for malware analysis. Accessible to anyone, it even uses trial versions of Windows if one doesn’t have his own license. How very cool! Just as your programming improves by studying great code… 😉 Enjoy! ### RTM: Stealthy group targeting remote banking system Saturday, February 25th, 2017 From the post: Today, we have released a white paper on RTM, a cybercrime group that has been relentlessly targeting businesses in Russia and neighboring countries using small, targeted campaigns. This group, active since at least 2015, is using malware, written in Delphi, to spy on its victims in a variety of ways, such as monitoring keystrokes and smart cards inserted into the system. It has the ability to upload files from the compromised system to its command and control (C&C) server. It also has a fingerprinting module to find systems on which specialized accounting software is installed. In particular, they are looking for signs of popular accounting software called “1C: Enterprise 8”. This software is used by businesses, among other things, to make bulk transfers via Remote Banking Systems (RBSes). The post and the white paper, Read The Manual: A Guide to the RTM Banking Trojan focus on the technical aspects of this series of attacks. It’s an interesting read despite a very poor pie chart at page 5: If hackers encountered accounts held by Trump family members, do you think that information will be leaked to the media? That’s one motive to become skilled at hacking banks. Others will occur to you over time. 😉 ### Advice For Serious Leakers Thursday, February 23rd, 2017 [T]he grugq is commenting on the story: A note on our lawsuit against Otto and Uber. If you are a serious leaker you should be able to use Internet search engines but just in case: Everyone has a favorite Linux distribution but Tails (#5) should be your default for leaking and Kali (#4) if you have more serious goals in mind. BTW, don’t expect any sympathy if these are your facts: We found that six weeks before his resignation this former employee, Anthony Levandowski, downloaded over 14,000 highly confidential and proprietary design files for Waymo’s various hardware systems, including designs of Waymo’s LiDAR and circuit board. To gain access to Waymo’s design server, Mr. Levandowski searched for and installed specialized software onto his company-issued laptop. Once inside, he downloaded 9.7 GB of Waymo’s highly confidential files and trade secrets, including blueprints, design files and testing documentation. Then he connected an external drive to the laptop. Mr. Levandowski then wiped and reformatted the laptop in an attempt to erase forensic fingerprints. Wow! That’s incredibly lame. You shouldn’t commit crimes at all but if you do, don’t embarrass everyone in IT. ### Letterlocking [Activist Security] Thursday, February 23rd, 2017 Letterlocking The technology of folding & securing an epistolary writing substrate to function as its own envelope. From the about page: Letterlocking – Unlocking History Welcome to letterlocking! You can find essential information about letterlocking and the Unlocking History research team on this page. We will be updating the website regularly in the coming months, including major uploads to the Dictionary of Letterlocking (DoLL) – so please check in periodically, and follow us on social media for all the news. Unlocking History Unlocking History is the name for a group of conservation specialists, scholars, publishers, book-artists, imaging specialists, engineers, and scientists who are interested in the historical practice of letterlocking. We want to make sure letters are conserved properly so that they can be studied for the historical secrets they reveal. The material features of letters can speak to us about the past, but in order to hear them we have to learn their language. Unlocking History is dedicated to bringing together all the tools we need to do so – a dictionary, instructional videos, images, and hands-on workshops in libraries, museums, universities, and schools around the world. Letterlocking and the Dictionary of Letterlocking (DoLL) Letterlocking refers to the technology of folding and securing an epistolary writing substrate to function as its own envelope – a vital communications technology before the invention of the mass-produced envelope in the 19th century. A full definition of letterlocking can be found in the Dictionary of Letterlocking (DoLL). Documenting the physical details of well-preserved letters has helped us discern and define different locking formats with multiple levels of built-in security and various authentication devices. DoLL will explain the key differences between these formats – and show you how to make them. With practice, you will be able to examine flattened historical letters in libraries and archives, and make models to show you which letterlocking format the writer or secretary was using. These formats may correlate to the sensitivity of the information contained inside, or contribute to the meaning of the text they carry. Imaging and Conservation The study of letterlocking is important for the preservation of documents because it informs conservators about the evidential value of folds, creases, and intentional damage. View and share images of letterlocking preservation: #PreserveTheFolds. Letterlocking interests curators and historians but has advantages for modern activists as well. Those advantages include: 1. Accessible to nearly anyone 2. Flummoxes the average FBI agent 3. Provides visual evidence of tampering 4. Slower search than digital communications 5. Supports physical encryption (measurable distances) Not to mention the use of “antiquated” technology will draw attention to the letters, whether they contain valuable or useless information. Government agents, being risk adverse, will fear some later review will prove the letters had valuable intelligence. A trap entirely of their own making and one you should exploit whenever possible. If that captures your interest, continue onto: A Postal Treasure Trove: In 1926, a seventeenth-century trunk of letters was bequeathed to the Museum voor Communicatie in The Hague, then as now the centre of government, politics, and trade in The Netherlands. The trunk belonged to one of the most active postmaster and post mistress of the day, Simon and Marie de Brienne, a couple at the heart of European communication networks. The chest contains an extraordinary archive: 2600 “locked” letters sent from all over Europe to this axis of communication, none of which were ever delivered. In the seventeenth century, the recipient also paid postal and delivery charges. But if the addressee was deceased, absent, or uninterested, no fees could be collected. Postmasters usually destroyed such “dead letters”, but the Briennes preserved them, hoping that someone would retrieve the letters – and pay the postage. Hence the nickname for the trunk: “the piggy bank” (spaarpotje). The trunk freezes a moment in history, allowing us to glimpse the early modern world as it went about its daily business. The letters are uncensored, unedited, and 600 of them even remain unopened. The archive itself has remained virtually untouched by historians until it was recently rediscovered. Our international and interdisciplinary team of researchers has now begun a process of preservation, digitization, transcription, editing, and identification of letterlocking formats that will reveal its secrets for the first time – even, we hope, those of the unopened letters. How cool is that? Letters preserved because the post office was hoping to nick the recipient for the postage! Does that explain pay-in-advance postal systems of today. 😉 Both Letterlocking and A Postal Treasure Trove provide links to other resources on letterlocking. On Twitter, follow @letterlocking, among others. Any CS/Math types in the crowd who want to express letterlocking more formally? Thinking of Paper Folding Geometry and the exploration of folding algorithms more generally, such as with protein folding (except in 2 dimensions). ### Transparent Government Has Arrived (sorta) Tuesday, February 21st, 2017 I saw US Cities Exposed: Industries and ICS, source of this graphic, in Violet Blue‘s report Hacking and infosec news: February 21, 2017 Violet’s report has other useful security news but I just had to share the increasing government transparency graphic with you. The growing insecurity of government computers makes the news organization stance that leakers must hand them documents all the more puzzling. I don’t know if that is a result of being hand fed all these years, genuine concern over prosecution or both. Think about it this way, short of a source outing themselves, how is anyone going to know that a journalist enlisted hackers versus having a genuine leaker? Put that way, perhaps there are loose confederations of hackers breaching government networks right now. (Sorry, didn’t mean to panic any security types.) 😉 Read the rest of the report and Violet’s post as well. Enjoy! ### Reversing HERMES ransomware Sunday, February 19th, 2017 From the description: Recording of the first live stream reverse engineering a new ransomware family. Lots of lessons learned for the next time 🙂 I haven’t made it through the entire video (almost four hours) but it is very impressive! Speaking of impressive, check out the Emisoft blog for more of same. Enjoy! ### Data Breach Digest 2017 (Verizon) Saturday, February 18th, 2017 Data Breach Digest (Verizon) From the report: The Situation Room Data breaches are complex affairs often involving some combination of human factors, hardware devices, exploited configurations or malicious software. As can be expected, data breach response activities—investigation, containment, eradication, notification, and recovery—are proportionately complex. These response activities, and the lingering post-breach aftereffects, aren’t just an IT security problem; they’re an enterprise problem involving Legal Counsel, Human Resources, Corporate Communications and other Incident Response (IR) stakeholders. Each of these stakeholders brings a slightly different perspective to the breach response effort. Last year, thousands of IR and cybersecurity professionals delved into the inaugural “Data Breach Digest—Scenarios from the Field” (aka “the RISK Team Ride-Along Edition”) to get a first-hand look into the inner workings of data breaches from an investigative response point of view (PoV). Continued research into our recent caseload still supports our initial inklings that just over a dozen or so prevalent scenarios occur at any given time. Carrying forward from last year, we have come to realize that these data breach scenarios aren’t so much about threat actors, or even about the vulnerabilities they exploited, but are more about the situations in which the victim organizations and their IR stakeholders find themselves. This gives each scenario a distinct personality … a unique persona, per se. This year, for the “Data Breach Digest—Perspective is Reality” (aka “the IR Stakeholder Edition”), we took a slightly different approach in bringing these scenarios to life. Each scenario narrative—again, based on real-world data breach response activities—is told from a different stakeholder PoV. As such, the PoV covers their critical decision pivot points, split-second actions taken, and crucial lessons learned from cases investigated by us – the Verizon RISK Team. … (emphasis in original) The “scenario” table mapping caught my eye: The Scenari-cature names signal an amusing and engaging report awaits! A must read! To make up for missing this last year, here’s a link to 2016 Data Breach Digest. ### Activists! Another Windows Vulnerability Saturday, February 18th, 2017 If software vulnerabilities were the new it bleeds it leads, news organizations would report on little else. Still, you have to credit The Hacker News with a great graphic for Google Discloses Windows Vulnerability That Microsoft Fails To Patch, Again! by Swati Khandelwal. Microsoft is once again facing embarrassment for not patching a vulnerability on time. Yes, Google’s Project Zero team has once again publicly disclosed a vulnerability (with POC exploit) affecting Microsoft’s Windows operating systems ranging from Windows Vista Service Pack 2 to the latest Windows 10 that had yet to be patched. … (emphasis in original) The Google report is more immediately useful but far less amusing that this post by Swati Khandelwal. Swati reports that without an emergency patch from Microsoft this month, attackers have almost 30 days to exploit this vulnerability. No rush considering the Verizon 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report shows hacks known since before 1999 are still viable: Taking that into account, plus the layering of insecure software on top of insecure software strategy of most potential targets: According to the Cisco 2017 Security Capabilities Benchmark Study, most companies use more than five security vendors and more than five security products in their environment. Fifty-five percent of the security professionals use at least six vendors; 45 percent use anywhere from one to five vendors; and 65 percent use six or more products. … (Cisco 2017 Annual Cybersecurity Report, page 5) Small targets could be more secure by going bare and pointing potential attackers to bank, competitor and finance targets with a BetterTargetsREADME file. (Warning: That is an untested suggestion.) ### Paying To Avoid A Scarlet A Friday, February 17th, 2017 From the post: Some 66% of companies would pay an average of$124k to avoid public shaming scandals following a security breach, according to a Bitdefender survey of 250 IT decision makers in the United States in companies with more than 1,000 PCs.

Some 14 percent would pay more than $500k, confirming that negative media headlines could have substantial financial consequences. In a recent case, officials from Verizon, which agreed to buy Yahoo’s core properties for$4.83 billion in July, told reporters that the company has “a reasonable basis” to suspect that the Yahoo security breach, one of the largest ever, could have a meaningful financial impact on the deal, according to multiple reports.

The ransomware report I was reading earlier said that 29% discounts off of original ransom demands are common and the trade tends to the low end, several hundred dollars.

Perhaps Barrons or the Wall Street Journal needs to find its way onto your reading list.

### Ransomware for Activists?

Friday, February 17th, 2017

An F-Secure infographic on ransomware starts:

That sounds a bit harsh don’t you think?

What if the ransomware in question were being used to:

• Cripple “business as usual” strategies of corporate entities
• Force divestiture from morally questionable entities or projects
• Interfere with unlawful surveillance
• Sanction illegal law enforcement conduct (Think Standing Rock)

Would you still agree with: Abandon All Ethical And Moral Principles[?]”

What if ransomware were used to stop:

• coal mining companies that dump “excess spoil” in rivers and streams
• oil transport companies that maintain leaky pipelines
• usurers such as title pawn companies
• police and prosecutors who abuse minorities
• (add your target(s) to the list)

Is that ethical and/or moral?

General state of ransomware, see Evalutating the Customer Journey of Cryto-Ransomware And the Paradox Behind It by F-Secure

Make your own decisions but relinquishing a weapon because your enemy thinks poorly of its use makes no sense to me.

### Bypassing ALLR Protection on 22 CPU Architectures (Why This Is Good News!)

Thursday, February 16th, 2017

A Simple JavaScript Exploit Bypasses ASLR Protection On 22 CPU Architectures by Swati Khandelwal.

From the post:

Security researchers have discovered a chip flaw that could nullify hacking protections for millions of devices regardless of their operating system or application running on them, and the worse — the flaw can not be entirely fixed with any mere software update.

The vulnerability resides in the way the memory management unit (MMU), a component of many CPUs, works and leads to bypass the Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) protection.

ASLR is a crucial security defense deployed by all modern operating systems from Windows and Linux to macOS, Android, and the BSDs.

In general, ASLR is a memory protection mechanism which randomizes the location where programs run in a device’s memory. This, in turn, makes it difficult for attackers to execute malicious payloads in specific spots in memory when exploiting buffer overflows or similar bugs.

In short, for attackers, it’s like an attempt to burglarize a house blindfolded.

But now a group of researchers, known as VUSec, from the Vrije University in the Netherlands have developed an attack that can bypass ASLR protection on at least 22 processor micro-architectures from popular vendors like Intel, AMD, ARM, Allwinner, Nvidia, and others.

The attack, dubbed ASLR Cache or AnC, is particularly serious because it uses simple JavaScript code to identify the base addresses in memory where system and application components are executed.

So, merely visiting a malicious site can trigger the attack, which allows attackers to conduct more attacks targeting the same area of the memory to steal sensitive information stored in the PC’s memory.

See Swati’s post for two videos demonstrating this unpatchable security flaw in action.

For a more formal explanation of the flaw,

ASLR on the Line: Practical Cache Attacks on the MMU by Ben Gras, et al.

Abstract:

Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is an important first line of defense against memory corruption attacks and a building block for many modern countermeasures. Existing attacks against ASLR rely on software vulnerabilities and/or on repeated (and detectable) memory probing.

In this paper, we show that neither is a hard requirement and that ASLR is fundamentally insecure on modern cachebased architectures, making ASLR and caching conflicting requirements (ASLR⊕Cache, or simply AnC). To support this claim, we describe a new EVICT+TIME cache attack on the virtual address translation performed by the memory management unit (MMU) of modern processors. Our AnC attack relies on the property that the MMU’s page-table walks result in caching page-table pages in the shared last-level cache (LLC). As a result, an attacker can derandomize virtual addresses of a victim’s code and data by locating the cache lines that store the page-table entries used for address translation.

Relying only on basic memory accesses allows AnC to be implemented in JavaScript without any specific instructions or software features. We show our JavaScript implementation can break code and heap ASLR in two major browsers running on the latest Linux operating system with 28 bits of entropy in 150
seconds. We further verify that the AnC attack is applicable to every modern architecture that we tried, including Intel, ARM and AMD. Mitigating this attack without naively disabling caches is hard, since it targets the low-level operations of the MMU. We conclude that ASLR is fundamentally flawed in sandboxed environments such as JavaScript and future defenses should not rely on randomized virtual addresses as a building block.

and,

Reverse Engineering Hardware Page Table Caches Using Side-Channel Attacks on the MMU by Stephan van Schaik, et al.

Abstract:

Recent hardware-based attacks that compromise systems with Rowhammer or bypass address-space layout randomization rely on how the processor’s memory management unit (MMU) interacts with page tables. These attacks often need to reload page tables repeatedly in order to observe changes in the target system’s behavior. To speed up the MMU’s page table lookups, modern processors make use of multiple levels of caches such as translation lookaside buffers (TLBs), special-purpose page table caches and even general data caches. A successful attack needs to flush these caches reliably before accessing page tables. To flush these caches from an unprivileged process, the attacker needs to create specialized memory access patterns based on the internal architecture and size of these caches, as well as on how the caches interact with each other. While information about TLBs and data caches are often reported in processor manuals released by the vendors, there is typically little or no information about the properties of page table caches on
different processors. In this paper, we retrofit a recently proposed EVICT+TIME attack on the MMU to reverse engineer the internal architecture, size and the interaction of these page table caches with other caches in 20 different microarchitectures from Intel, ARM and AMD. We release our findings in the form of a library that provides a convenient interface for flushing these caches as well as automatically reverse engineering page table caches on new architectures.

#### So, Why Is This Good News?

Everything exists in a context and security flaws are no exception to that rule.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the Securities and Exchange Commission relating to “Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers” (published at 81 Fed. Reg. 49359 (July 27, 2016)), and such rule shall have no force or effect.
… (emphasis in original)

That may not sound like much until you read Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, issued by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), which reads in part:

SUMMARY:

We are adopting Rule 13q-1 and an amendment to Form SD to implement Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act relating to the disclosure of payments by resource extraction issuers. Rule 13q-1 was initially adopted by the Commission on August 22, 2012, but it was subsequently vacated by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act added Section 13(q) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which directs the Commission to issue rules requiring resource extraction issuers to include in an annual report information relating to any payment made by the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer, or an entity under the control of the issuer, to a foreign government or the Federal Government for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. Section 13(q) requires a resource extraction issuer to provide information about the type and total amount of such payments made for each project related to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, and the type and total amount of payments made to each government. In addition, Section 13(q) requires a resource extraction issuer to provide information about those payments in an interactive data format.
… (emphasis in original)

Or as By Alex Guillén says in Trump signs bill killing SEC rule on foreign payments:

President Donald Trump Tuesday signed the first in a series of congressional regulatory rollback bills, revoking an Obama-era regulation that required oil and mining companies to disclose their payments to foreign governments.

The danger posed to global corruption by this SEC rule has passed.

What hasn’t passed is the staffs of foreign governments and resource extraction issuers remain promiscuous web surfers.

Web surfers who will easily fall prey to a JavaScript exploit that bypasses ASLR protection!

Rather than protecting global corruption, H.J.Res 41 increases the incentives for breaching the networks of foreign governments and resource extraction issuers. You may find payment information and other embarrassing and/or incriminating information.

ASLR Cache or AnC gives you another tool for mining the world of the elites.

Rejoice at every new systemic security flaw. The elites have more to hide than youthful indiscretions and records of poor marital fidelity.

### Investigating A Cyberwar

Thursday, February 16th, 2017

From the post:

Editor’s Note: As the Syrian civil war has played out on the battlefields with gunshots and mortars, a parallel conflict has been fought online. The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), a pro-Assad government group of hackers, has wielded bytes and malware to obtain crucial information from opponents of the Assad regime. The extracted information has led to arrests and torture of dissidents. In this interview, GIJN’s Eunice Au talks to Al Jazeera’s Juliana Ruhfus about the methodology and challenges of her investigation into the SEA and the process of transforming the story into an online game.

How did the idea for a documentary on the SEA come about? Who was part of your investigative team and how long did it take?

￼I had the idea for the film when I came across a report called “Behind Syria’s Digital Frontline,” published by a company called FireEye, cybersecurity analysts who had come across a cache of 30,000 Skype conversations that pro-Assad hackers had stolen from anti-Assad fighters. The hack provided a unique insight into the strategic intelligence that had been obtained from the Skype conversations, including Google images plans that outlined the battle at Khirbet Ghazaleh and images of missiles which the rebels were trying to purchase.

The fascinating thing was, it also shed light on how the hack was carried out. Pro-Assad hackers had created female avatars who befriended fighters on the front line by telling them how much they admired them and eventually asked to exchange photos. These images were infected with malware which proved devastating once downloaded. Computers in the field are shared by many fighters, allowing the hackers to spy on a large number of targets at once.

When I read the report I had the Eureka moment that I wait for when I am looking for a new idea: I could visualize the “invisible” cyberwar story and, for the first time ever, I really understood the crucial role that social engineering plays in hacking, that is the hacker’s psychological skill to get someone to click on an infected link.

I then shot the film together with director Darius Bazargan. Ozgur Kizilatis and Alexander Niakaris both did camera work and Simon Thorne was the editor. We filmed in London, Turkey, and France, and all together the production took just under three months.
… (emphasis in original)

C-suite level material but quite good, if a bit heavy-handed in its support for rebel forces in Syria. I favor the foxes over the hounds as well but prefer a more balanced approach to the potential of cyberwarfare.

Cyberweapons have the potential to be great equalizers with conventional forces. Punishing the use or supplying of cyberweapons, as Juliana reports here, is more than a little short-sighted. True, the Assad regime may have the cyber advantage today, but what about tomorrow? Or other governments?

### EFF Dice-Generated Passphrases

Wednesday, February 15th, 2017

EFF Dice-Generated Passphrases

From the post:

Create strong passphrases with EFF’s new random number generators! This page includes information about passwords, different wordlists, and EFF’s suggested method for passphrase generation. Use the directions below with EFF’s random number generator member gift or your own set of dice.

Or you can order five Bicycle dice from Amazon. (Search for dice while you are there. I had no idea there were so many distinct dice sets.)

It’s mentioned but not emphasized that many sites don’t allow passphrases. Which forces you to fall back onto passwords. A password manager enables you to use different, strong passwords for every account.

Password managers should always be protected by strong passphrases. Keys to the kingdom as it were.

### big-list-of-naughty-strings

Wednesday, February 15th, 2017

From the webpage:

The Big List of Naughty Strings is a list of strings which have a high probability of causing issues when used as user-input data.

You won’t see any of these strings on the Tonight Show with Jimmy Fallon. 😉

They are “naughty” when used as user-input data.

For those searching for a starting point for legal liability, failure to test and/or document testing against this data set would be a good place to start.

Have you tested against the big-list-of-naughty-strings?

### Designing a Business Card in LaTeX (For Your New Alt-Identities)

Monday, February 13th, 2017

From the post:

In 2017, I will graduate from Ghent University. This means starting a professional career, either in academia or in industry. One of the first things that came to mind was that I needed a good curriculum vitæ, and a business card. I already have the former, but I still needed a business card. Consequently, I looked a bit online and was not all that impressed by the tools people used to design them. I did not want to change some template everybody’s using, but do my own thing. And suddenly, I realised: what better tool than LaTeX to make it!

I know, I already hear some saying “why not use the online tools?” or “Photoshop?”. I picked LaTeX because I want to have a platform independent implementation and because why not? I really like making LaTeX documents, so this seemed like something other than creating long documents.

So, how are we going to create it? First, we’ll make a template for the front and back sides. Then, we will modify this to our needs and have a perfectly formatted and aligned business card.

One of the few fun tasks in the creation of an alternative identity should be the creation of a new business card.

Olivier’s post gets you started on the LaTeX side, although an eye-catching design is on you.

It’s too late for some of us to establish convincing alternative identities.

On the other hand, alternative identities should be established for children before they are twelve or so. Complete interlocking financial, social, digital, etc. for each one.

It doesn’t make you a bad parent if you haven’t done so but a verifiable and alternative identity could be priceless in an uncertain world.

### Opening Secure Channels for Confidential Tips [Allocating Risk for Leaks]

Thursday, February 9th, 2017

From the post:

In Shields Up, security user researcher Martin Shelton writes about security threats and defenses for journalists. Below, his first installment. —eds

To make it easier for tipsters to share sensitive information, a growing number of news organizations are launching resources for confidential tips. While there is some overlap between the communication channels that each news organization supports, it’s not always clear which channels are the most practical for routine use. This short guide will describe some basics around how to think about security on behalf of your sources before thinking about tools and practices. I’ll also describe common communication channels for accepting sensitive tips and tradeoffs when using each channel. When thinking about tradeoffs, consider which channels are right for you.
… (emphasis in original)

Martin does a great job of surveying your current security options but doesn’t address the allocation of risk between leakers and news organizations that I covered in U.S. Leaking Law: You Go To Jail – I Win A Pulitzer and/or the option of leaking access rather than the risk of leaking data/documents, How-To: Leaking In Two Steps.

Here’s the comment I’m posting to his post and I will report back on his response, probably in a separate post:

Martin, great job on covering the security options for tips and their tradeoffs!

I do have a question though about the current model of leaking, which puts all of the risk on the leaker. A leaker undertakes the burden of liberating data and/or documents, takes the risk of copying/removing them and then the risk of getting them securely to a news organization.

All of which requires technical skills that aren’t common.

As an alternative, why shouldn’t leakers leak access to such networks/servers and enable news organizations, who have greater technical resources, to undertake the risks of retrieval of such documents?

I mentioned this to another news person and they quickly pointed out the dangers of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) for a news organization but the same holds true for the leaker. Who very likely has fewer technical skills than any news organization.

Thinking that news organizations can decide to serve the interests of government (follow the CFAA) or they can decided to serve the public interest. In my view, those are not synonymous.

I am still refining ways that leakers could securely leak access but at present, using standard subscription forms with access information instead of identifying properties, offers both a trustworthy target (the news organization) and a multiplicity of places to leak, which prevents effective monitoring of them. I have written more than once about this topic but two of particular interest: U.S. Leaking Law: You Go To Jail – I Win A Pulitzer, and, How-To: Leaking In Two Steps.

Before anyone protests the “ethics” of breaking laws such as the CFAA, recall governments broke faith with their citizens first. Laws like the CFAA are monuments to that breach of faith. Nothing more.

### Fileless attacks against enterprise networks

Thursday, February 9th, 2017

Kaspersky Lab reports in Fileless attacks against enterprise networks the discovery of malware that hides in memory to avoid detection.

It’s summary:

During incident response, a team of security specialists needs to follow the artefacts that attackers have left in the network. Artefacts are stored in logs, memories and hard drives. Unfortunately, each of these storage media has a limited timeframe when the required data is available. One reboot of an attacked computer will make memory acquisition useless. Several months after an attack the analysis of logs becomes a gamble because they are rotated over time. Hard drives store a lot of needed data and, depending on its activity, forensic specialists may extract data up to a year after an incident. That’s why attackers are using anti-forensic techniques (or simply SDELETE) and memory-based malware to hide their activity during data acquisition. A good example of the implementation of such techniques is Duqu2. After dropping on the hard drive and starting its malicious MSI package it removes the package from the hard drive with file renaming and leaves part of itself in the memory with a payload. That’s why memory forensics is critical to the analysis of malware and its functions. Another important part of an attack are the tunnels that are going to be installed in the network by attackers. Cybercriminals (like Carbanak or GCMAN) may use PLINK for that. Duqu2 used a special driver for that. Now you may understand why we were very excited and impressed when, during an incident response, we found that memory-based malware and tunnelling were implemented by attackers using Windows standard utilities like “SC” and “NETSH“.

Kaspersky reports 140 enterprises in 40 countries have been affected by the malware:

The reported focus has been on banking/financial targets, which implies to me that political targets are not preparing for this type of attack.

If you are going to “play in the street,” an American expression meaning to go in harm’s way, be sure to read the attribution section carefully and repeatedly. Your skills aren’t useful to anyone if you are in prison.