In my continuing search for information on the authenticity of Dabiq (see: Dabiq, ISIS and Data Skepticism) I encountered Slick, agile and modern – the IS media machine by Mina Al-Lami.
Mina makes it clear that IS (ISIL/ISIS) has been the target of a campaign to shut down all authentic outlets for news from the group:
…
IS has always relied heavily on hordes of online supporters to amplify its message. But their role has become increasingly important in recent months as the group’s official presence on a variety of social media platforms has been shut down and moved underground.The group’s ability to keep getting its message out in the face of intensive counter-measures is due to the agility, resilience and adaptability of this largely decentralized force.
Until July this year, IS, like most jihadist groups, had a very strong presence on Twitter, with all its central and regional media outlets officially active on the platform. However, its military successes on the ground in Iraq and Syria in June triggered a concerted and sustained clampdown on the group’s accounts.
IS was initially quick to replace these accounts, in what became a game of whack-a-mole between IS and the Twitter administration. But by July the group appeared to have abandoned any attempt to maintain an official open presence there.
Instead, IS began experimenting with a string of less known social media platforms. These included the obscure Friendica, Quitter and Diaspora – all of which promise better privacy and data-protection than Twitter – as well as the popular Russian VKontakte.
Underground channels
While accounts on Friendica and Quitter were shut down within days, the official IS presence on Diaspora and VKontakte lasted several weeks before their involvement in the distribution of high profile beheading videos caused them too to be shut down.
Since the accounts on VKontakte were closed in September, IS appears to have resorted to underground channels to surface its material, making no attempt to advertise an official social media presence. Perhaps surprisingly, this has not yet caused any problems for the group in terms of authenticating its output.
Once a message has surfaced – via channels that are currently difficult to pin down – it is disseminated by loosely affiliated media groups who are capable of mobilizing a vast network of individual supporters on social media to target specific audiences.
…
Unfortunately, Mina misses the irony of reporting that IS has no authentic outlets in one breath to relying in the next breath on non-authentic materials (such as Dabiq) to talk about the group’s social media prowess.
Suppression of authentic content outlets for IS leaves an interested reader at the mercy of governments, news organizations and others who have a variety of motives for attributing content to IS.
As I mentioned in my last post:
Debates about international and national policy should not be based on faked evidence (such as “yellow cake uranium“) or faked publications.
I have heard the argument that IS content recruits support for terrorism. I have read propaganda attributed to IS, the Khmer Rouge, the KKK and terrorists sponsored by Western governments. I can report not the slightest interest in supporting or participating with any of them.
The recruitment argument is a variation of the fear of allowing gays, drug use, drinking, etc., on television would result in children growing up to be gay drug addicts with drinking problems. I can report that no sane person credits that fear today. (If you have that fear, contact your local mental health service for an appointment.)
Why is IS attractive? Hard to say given the lack of authentic information on its goals and platform, perhaps its reported opposition to corrupt governments in the Middle East?
If I weren’t concerned with corrupt Western governments I might be more concerned with governments in the Middle East. But, as they say, best to start cleaning your own house before complaining about the state of another’s.